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Abstract
This response to “Toward a Transformative Criticality for Democratic Citizenship Education” takes a
positive and supportive stance toward pressing the arguments forward. By focusing on the communicative components of democratic citizenship education and activist pedagogy, it highlights some of
the tensions and difficulties of actually doing this work.

This article is in response to
Sibbett, L. (2016). Toward a Transformative Criticality for Democratic Citizenship Education.
Democracy & Education, 24(2), Article 1. Available at: http:// democracyeducationjournal.org/home/
vol24/iss2/1
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ou do not often find your work getting such
generous and thoughtful treatment as mine receives
in this essay, and I am grateful to Sibbett (2016) for
engaging these issues and pressing the conversation further in
some very fruitful and insightful directions. In that spirit, I want to
build further upon this conversation, and revisit along the way
some of my earlier work on criticality.
There were three main themes in that essay with Rupert
Berk (Burbules & Berk, 1999). One was that the critical thinking
and the critical pedagogy traditions each offer a valuable critical
perspective on the other; while there are some areas of overlap,
their real benefit is dialectical: The critical pedagogy tradition
highlights how critical thinking analyses neglect issues of power;
the critical thinking tradition highlights how critical pedagogy
assumes certain political stances that, because they are unquestioned, can lead to a kind of indoctrination. The second concern
was that each of these traditions is insufficiently self-critical—
that a thoroughgoing criticality is willing to pull up its own roots
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and to question its own elisions (as any theory or world view
has). This produces a critical stance that is more provisional and
less authoritative, grounded in an attitude of questioning and
doubt rather than an assertion of a superior epistemic (or
political) standpoint (Burbules, 1995). The third is that our
notion of criticality includes the capacity for thinking differently,
putting one’s self outside of any potential hegemony (of the right
or of the left).
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In this essay, Sibbett (2016) took up some of the themes of that
essay and developed her own conception of criticality, which she
called “transformative criticality.” Part of the question here is how
the educational value of promoting a critical orientation is tied to
certain notions of citizenship and discourse in public life. Sibbett
questioned an approach toward “democratic citizenship” grounded
in ideas of pluralism, tolerance, and reasonable deliberation. That
account, grounded in the liberal tradition, sees criticality as a
means for contrasting points of view to engage one another, openly,
with tolerance and respect, questioning one another and seeking
understanding and consensus within a discursive style that is
critical but reasonable. That process of engagement may entail
conflict, difference, and rigorous disagreement, but within a
framework of shared values and purposes: the pursuit of truth, the
achievement of compromise, and the empathetic appreciation of
cultural differences (Burbules & Rice, 1991). This approach
exemplifies the virtues of a liberal democracy, Sibbett pointed out,
and for that reason is more easily accommodated in traditional
educational contexts.
The problem with this approach is not that it is impossible or
wrong in its objectives. It is difficult to imagine an educational
context that we would call educational that does not embrace aims
like the pursuit of truth, the achievement of compromise, or the
empathetic appreciation of cultural differences. The problem is
that in conditions of unequal power or cultural dominance, the
reasonable rules of the game for the pursuit of these aims are felt
and experienced differently by some participants; what might look
like an uncoerced consensus or agreement might in fact be built
upon exclusions that do not accommodate certain voices and
points of view because they cannot be expressed within the rules of
that game. Everyone who speaks and participates may be satisfied,
but the problem is for those who do not. So, we need a critical
orientation that can recognize, question, and give voice to those
exclusions.
Sibbett’s (2016) alternative is based upon three key ideas. One,
adapted from Apple, is a “decentered unity,” a coalescence around
an idea of common good that balances the values of respecting
difference and of solidarity. It is “decentered” because it is not built
around a priori principles and “not reducible to one understanding.” The second, drawing from Westheimer and Kahne, is the idea
of “participatory and justice-oriented citizenship,” participatory
because it involves actual engagement with government and
community organizations directed toward “accomplishing collective tasks,” and justice-oriented because it grows out of a recognition and critique of “systems and structures that reproduce patterns
of injustice.” The third grows out of Sibbett’s own conception of
wholeheartedness, an effort to reconcile the apparent duality of
reasonableness and fervent critique within a more wholistic,
passionate caring that encompasses grief, outrage, and “listening
generously,” the sentiments of despair and hope, the impulses
toward activism and deliberation. Sibbett’s conception of transformative criticality seeks to ground the idea of critique in the conditions that actually make transformative praxis possible; it strives to
achieve a synthesis of ideas that do not always cohabit easily,
embracing tensions rather than trying to easily resolve them, and
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keeping constantly in mind the conditions that actually enable and
empower people toward committed action.
Does this synthesis succeed? Sibbett (2016) cited the work of
Stitzlein (2012) in her book Teaching for Dissent as a model of the
synthesis of critical thinking and critical pedagogy underlying the
idea of “transformative criticality.” This line of influence is not
entirely surprising, since Stitzlein is a former student of mine—
though I do not mean by this to take any credit for her work and
ideas. Sibbett identified in Stitzlein’s book parallels with the three
key ideas of decentered unities, participatory and justice-oriented
citizenship, and wholeheartedness that she is advocating, even
when Stitzlein’s terminology might differ. Clearly we are talking
about a scholarly research program here with diverse lines of
influence and convergence.
In supporting and building on Sibbett’s argument, I want to
emphasize the central role of communication in each of the three
key ideas that she draws together. For me, actual processes of
communication are the place where second-order principles of
social and political commitment get worked out in practice, and
our abilities to make these processes of communication work are
essential to the success of coordinated action and understanding
directed toward progressive change.
Habermas’s distinction of strategic communication and
communication directed toward understanding provides a useful
starting point (1984). Activist pedagogy, and the specific activities
that constitute it, continually raise the question of whether the goal
is to bring about a specific state of affairs that the pedagogue has in
mind, and which the students are intended to believe in and work
toward, or whether it is to enable and empower students to make
choices, set goals, and pursue actions that may yield a range of
possible outcomes—some of which might be quite different from
what the pedagogue has in mind. In the first instance, “social
justice” is a shorthand for a set of specific beliefs about how society
ought to be organized, and the only question is how to accomplish
it; in the second instance, the pedagogue has to be prepared for
student choices that (may) surprise and disappoint them. Sibbett
(2016) characterized this dilemma as the problem of avoiding
“indoctrination,” and pedagogically that is a crucial issue. But it is
also a question of whether the pedagogue presumes to know the
choices others ought to make and how society should be organized.
In one sense, this more teleological view of activism is a legacy of
the Marxist roots of critical pedagogy, even now as it has been
vastly complicated by considerations of race, ethnicity, gender, and
sexuality. Marx believed there was an achievable state of communism, equality, and freedom, in which conflict would come to an
end. On this view, transformation is the transformation from A to B,
where B is a given endpoint. Sibbett, I believe, was trying to avoid
that association. Habermas’s distinction, then, forces us to ask
whether pedagogical communication, in the classroom and other
venues, is strategic—designed to produce a particular outcome—or more open-ended, a process aimed toward understanding and choice that may yield a set of conclusions that cannot be
predicted or determined in advance.
First, a “decentered unity,” as Sibbett (2016) described it, is a
prime example of an outcome that cannot be determined in
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advance. It is closely akin to the idea of a “third space,” an idea I
explored at some length in a previous essay:
A third space . . . is not a “middle ground” or “merging” or “compromise”
between the original views, but a reframing of the topic—one that may
indeed implicitly challenge the way in which the topic is originally being
framed. Furthermore, a third space is not necessarily a “solution” to the
problem of disagreement or misunderstanding. Some appropriations of
the term want to domesticate the notion, turn it into another way in
which “bad” conflicts can be made to go away, or work out nicely. But I
would insist that third spaces are problematic and problematizing
moments, risky and as prone to chaos, or even heightened conflict, as to
producing new understandings. Viewing third space as a mutually
established, shared discursive zone also reveals its provisional character,
bounded in circumstance, space, and time. Sometimes discursive third
spaces are linked to actual border zones—a room, a street, a table, an
open plain, where contending parties meet—and sometimes also are
linked to specific practices, even rituals, that establish an un-usual place
and time . . . Most important, third spaces, while requiring the
participation of multiple actors from different discursive frames (and in
this sense having a consensual character) do not necessarily yield
anything that can be called in a simple way consent, agreement, or
understanding. Conflicts which preceded the encounter may still exist,
perhaps even with a heightened and more vivid impact. Third spaces do
not necessarily make conflicts go away—that is not their primary
purpose and value. They become a potential framework in which to
recognize and discuss those conflicts with fresh terms and perspectives,
and in that possibly to understand them better . . . It requires a tolerance
for a certain kind of friction, risk, and uncertainty. It requires a
judgment about who is worth pursuing such understandings with, and
who is not. (Burbules, 2006, 114-115)

A third space is a communicative achievement: situated and
contingent, accomplished by actual people in actual circumstances.
It is not generalizable to other people or other circumstances. Like
other aspects of Sibbett’s arguments, it tries to get past dualities of
optimism and pessimism, to pragmatic possibilities and hope (this
is another point of contact with Stitzlein’s work). It presses past
Habermas’s idea of communication aimed toward agreement or
understanding to recognize that the outcomes of communication
can have a variety of forms, some of them difficult and unstable,
that are not necessarily convergent.
Second, the idea of “participatory and justice-oriented
citizenship” also has a communicative core. Sibbett (2016) cited the
work of Sanders (1997), “Against Deliberation,” which argued that
in conditions of unequal power, debate cannot always be reasonable. In Sanders’ view, critique may sometimes become intemperate
(p. 6). My avenue into this same idea comes from Young, who
distinguishes deliberative and activist speech Young, I. M. (2001).
Both are valuable in a democracy, but the rules of each are fundamentally different. Deliberation is a communicative stance geared
toward speaking, listening, and working through a problem.
Activist speech foregrounds conflict; it is oppositional and does not
need (or want) a response. One might say that deliberation is
speaking with; activist speech is speaking to, perhaps at, or even
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against. In these twin notions, we see contrasting ideas of participatory citizenship, each perhaps suited to a particular set of circumstances, but not consistent with each other. To oversimplify: The
deliberative approach prevails when you have a seat at the table; the
activist approach when you are excluded from the table and want to
challenge who is there, and why you are not. Sibbett sought to
cultivate “both engagement and dissent,” which seems right to me,
but this perhaps underestimates the very different communicative
rules, roles, and capabilities that support each of those valued goals.
The kinds of people who are communicatively good at one, or more
motivated to pursue one, may not be very good at the other.
The question of “justice-oriented” citizenship raises again
the contrast between teleological and process-oriented conceptions of justice: whether one thinks one knows what an ideal
society should look like, or whether one is committed to paths of
engagement, exploration, and experimentation that may result in
a range of possible (and unpredictable) futures. The characterization of justice-oriented citizenship provided by Sibbett (2016) is
mainly negative: she cites Westheimer and Kahne’s appeal to
teach young people to “question, debate, and change established
systems and structures that reproduce patterns of injustice over
time” (p. 8). That helps us in understanding the critical dimension
of challenging those systems and structures but not in identifying
where they should be changed, overthrown, or replaced with
something better. What constitutes “better”? And who decides?
Another legacy of the Marxist tradition is a dichotomous view of
conflict: Group A is always right, and group B is always to blame;
all conflict is the result of X, and if you can just transform or
overthrow X, everything will be better. Many left critical positions
still derive from this mode of thinking, and their conception of
transformation is accordingly thin. The sources of human conflict
and injustice are in fact multiple and cannot be traced to just one
source. When one looks at things this way, there cannot be simple
dualities of oppressor and oppressed, and one’s theory of social
change or transformation cannot be reduced to simply taking
sides in advancing one group’s interests over another’s or overthrowing one particular system and replacing it with something
else. What we need, I would suggest broadly, is an ongoing,
iterative process of critique, reform, and self-questioning. There is
no utopian end state.
Dissent and activist speech are essential dimensions of
protest and agitating for change, and they often depend on implicit
assumptions about directions for that change; but insofar as they
arise from visceral reactions of anger or outrage at an existing
injustice, they can be unreliable guides for positive action. In my
experience, they often yield the political response of demands and
assertion of principles as absolutes, which may have an invigorating political force but are not very compatible with the deliberative
approach that is necessary to actually analyze problems, propose
policies, and work toward acceptable compromises in the face of
inevitable differences of opinion. Here again, focusing on the
communicative dimension of these speech acts helps clarify the
deep tensions between these political stances.
Third, I greatly appreciate Sibbett’s (2016) discussion of
wholeheartedness, because it helps to draw our attention to the
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inescapable emotional dimension of political communication and
political action. One of the shortcomings of Habermas’s theory is
that he conceives communication in almost purely cognitive terms.
But language is not just for the expression of belief or the assertion
of normative claims. Language, especially political language, is
spoken by people with feelings, hopes, and fears. When political
communication takes the form of “impassioned outcry” or
expresses “grief, outrage, and despair” (Sibbett, 2016, p. 8) its moral
force derives not only from its overt content but from the emotional impulses that give rise to it. Before there is critique, often,
there is that raw prereflective sense of wrong: Sometimes even the
simple, loud utterance of “No!” It is crucial to recognize, as Sibbett’s
account does, that this level of emotion and feeling is often
inseparable from the “unwavering commitment” (p. 8) that
supports sustained effort to pursue change beyond the articulation
of critique.
I admire all of this. But I want to, again, suggest a deeper
tension and difficulty. As I mentioned, visceral outrage does not
help us see, and may in fact interfere with, the formulation of a
positive alternative and a way of realistically achieving it. Part of
nonindoctrinatory citizenship education of the sort Sibbett (2016)
envisioned is to highlight for students the history of idealism gone
awry, of good intentions that end up yielding their opposite, of
absolutisms that end up creating their own oppressions, or of
Berlinian conflicts between values that force hard choices and
situated, workable compromises (Berlin, 2013). Deliberation, in
other words, is not the opposite of activist speech: It is the objective
toward which activist speech or dissent must be directed. You can
demand a seat at the table, but once you are at the table, the
language of demands does not work anymore. Within the deliberative frame you can challenge the terms of discussion, the positions
of unequal power, or the privileging of certain ways of communicating. But you cannot always and only be doing that, or else
participation is pointless. Levinson (2002) wrote:
Like the deliberative democrat, the activist is looking for a way to shift
the focus from the interests of the powerful to the interests of the
broader polity. Unlike the deliberative democrat, however, the activist
does not think that the interests of the politically impoverished are
likely to make their way into deliberative fora unless the
disempowered use activist strategies to disrupt the way particular
debates are framed. In short, the work of activists lays the groundwork
for genuinely democratic deliberation. Far from derailing deliberative
democracy, activism keeps it in on track. (p. 59)

Reasonableness is not the foil against which to contrast some
other mode of communicative engagement, nor is it the a priori
privilege of certain people or groups: It is the difficult, contingent
social practice of pursuing the solutions to certain problems in a
way that respects differences and critically acknowledges the forces
of context and history, without giving in to them. Reasonableness
is what we work toward—what we must work toward—in any
context that can legitimately be called educational.
That final point, I hope, provides the coda for this discussion,
because Sibbett’s (2016) work, and Stitzlein’s (2012), and my own,
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all operate within a space of not only analyzing the features of
critical politics and citizenship writ large but of specifically caring
about what these mean in the context of an education that prepares
people for those activities. An activist pedagogy that is not clear
about its educational goals may become indoctrinatory. An activist
pedagogy that focuses only on the capacity for critique and not on
the capacities and dispositions for positive, transformative action
may leave students angry but futile. An activist pedagogy that
neglects the institutional and other arenas in which citizenship
actually happens will not provide students with the skills and
understandings to be effective agents of change. And, as I have
argued here, an activist pedagogy that overemphasizes specific
teleologies threatens to produce just a different kind of absolutism
and intolerance.1
If this is right, then we can open up a new set of questions—
some of them empirical questions—about what sorts of educational experiences will provide students with these capacities and
dispositions. Age and developmental readiness will be factors, as
will the background and characteristics of different kinds of
students from different backgrounds. An approach, for example,
may be indoctrinatory when pursued with very young students but
not so with more mature learners. Here and in many other contexts
I have challenged the tendency of educators to seek the one
approach, the new alternative or innovation, that will transform
the classroom and energize the learning experience for all students.
Unfortunately, progressive educators have often been just as
susceptible to this illusory pursuit of “one best system” as the
technocrats or normalizers they decry. If there is anything we
should have learned it is that no one approach works for all
students, for all needs and interests, for all learning styles, for all
ages, for all contexts. There is no approach certain to succeed, and
there is no approach that will not have some detrimental effects, for
some students, at the same time that it is benefitting others
(Burbules, 1990). Our choices, then, must also be about balancing,
managing tensions, and working over time to revise and improve
our efforts as we learn from our mistakes and failures.
And these, for me, are not only good principles for educators
–they are good principles for thinking about politics as well.

Notes
1. I explore some of these questions further in my introduction to Boler’s
important book, Dialogue in Education: Troubling Speech, Disturbing
Silence.
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